As the Houthi militant group in Yemen ramps up its attacks on vessels in the Red Sea 鈥 ostensibly in response to what it calls Israel鈥檚 鈥溾 in Gaza 鈥 the US and UK have responded with multiple听听in the last week. The US has also re-listed the group as a听.
The hope is these strikes will pressure the Iran-aligned Houthis to back down. It won鈥檛, however. Short of a complete halt to Israel鈥檚 war in Gaza and a 180-degree shift in Western support for Israel鈥檚 approach, there is little that will dissuade the Houthis to change course in the foreseeable future.
There are three main reasons for this, none of which are principally about Iran鈥檚 regional strategy.
The first, and most obvious, reason is the Houthi movement, whose political wing is known as听, has already withstood years of airstrikes in its war with a Saudi-led and Western-backed coalition from 2015鈥2022.
Prior to this, the Houthis fought six wars against the central Yemeni government from 2004鈥2010. Guerrilla warfare is not new to them, and harassing ships off their coast does not require sophisticated weapons.
罢丑别听听that accompanied much of the recent war (which is currently in a shaky truce) also helped the Houthis to finetune their听听from Iran, as well as their own听听.
As a result, airstrikes alone are unlikely to deliver a knockout blow to their military capacity and will almost certainly increase their appetite for a fight.
That is because they can 鈥 for the first time 鈥 more strongly frame their actions in the context of fighting against the US and Israel, per their听: 鈥淕od is Great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.鈥
The second reason they are unlikely to be deterred is more important, but less understood, because it is about Yemen鈥檚 domestic politics.
The Houthis currently control much of Yemen, including the capital Sana'a, which accounts for around 70% of the population. The people in these regions have been subjected to years of acute and structural violence by the Houthis. This includes:
Yemenis at a camp for internally displaced people in Sana'a, Yemen, in November.听Yahya Arhab/EPA/AAP
It is important to note the Saudi-led coalition and internationally recognised Yemeni government have听听been accused of committing听听and grave human rights听听in Yemen, including the听听of civilians and civilian infrastructure.
At least听听people are estimated to have died violently in the war that began in 2015, though the challenges with collecting such听听are considerable. This also does not include the many more thousands that have died from听听and disease.
The behaviour of the Houthis in power has made them deeply unpopular. Dissent is dangerous due to the sophisticated听听of repression and neighbourhood听听the Houthis have imposed in the areas they control. But Yemenis began taking to the street in protest last year anyway in听听and the besieged city of听.
Then on September 26, just before Hamas鈥 assault on southern Israel and Israel鈥檚 bombardment of Gaza, Yemenis defied the authorities in large numbers.
In protests in the capital city of Sana'a, they celebrated the anniversary of the 1962 revolution that ousted the country鈥檚 leader, the Zaydi Imam, Mohammed al-Badr 鈥 and with him, the听kinship-based听autocracy that听听claim the Houthis听听to听.
Seeing this (rightly) as a demonstration against them, the Houthis were shaken.听听reported they responded with an 鈥渁larming wave of arrests鈥 and 鈥渁 draconian show of force.鈥
Against a background of rising dissent at home, the Houthis鈥 actions and Western retaliation have given the group the gift of 鈥,鈥 according to Yemeni analysts. The US-led strikes also give credence to the Houthis鈥 demands that critics 鈥.鈥
And just as important, the US strikes can boost the Houthis鈥 military recruitment efforts. And this could help them attempt to seize the government-held oil wells in听听again, which the group needs to become economically sustainable.
The third reason the Houthis are unlikely to be deterred by airstrikes or a terrorist designation is that their actions articulate the wider region鈥檚 fury at Israel鈥檚 war in Gaza, which has so far claimed the听, and the decades of Western support for Israel鈥檚 policies in occupied Gaza and the West Bank.
They have also tapped into profound grievances about the West鈥檚 policies more generally and its record of reinforcing unpopular regimes in the face of popular action for听. This includes the selling of听听and bestowing of political legitimacy to authoritarian regimes in exchange for what the West considers 鈥溾 in the world order.
Yemenis are, however, keenly aware that the Houthis鈥 rise and expansion was enabled by this same external push for听, which came at the expense of Yemenis鈥 ability to determine听听to听.
By centring the defence of Palestinians in their actions, the Houthis have found a way to discredit their domestic opponents 鈥 something that has largely eluded them for 20 years. This will make them even harder to dislodge from power and will likely consign ordinary Yemenis to further violence at their hands.
Sarah G. Phillips is Professor of Global Conflict and Development, an award winning author, and an Australian Research Council Future Fellow. Her research draws from years of in-depth fieldwork, and focuses on international intervention in the global south, knowledge production about conflict-affected states, and non-state governance, with a geographic focus on the Middle East and Africa. This story was first published in The Conversation as .听Top image: Osamah Abdulrahman/AP/AAP